Doctrines of Epicurus
Guardians of Darkness
Sovran Maxims
1. A blessed and indestructible
being has no trouble himself and brings
no trouble upon any other being; so he is free from anger and partiality,
for all such things imply weakness.
2. Death is nothing to us;
for that which has been dissolved into its
elements experiences no sensations, and that which has no sensation is
nothing to us.
3. The magnitude of pleasure
reaches its limit in the removal of all
pain. When such pleasure is present, so long as it is uninterrupted,
there is no pain either of body or of mind or of both together.
4. Continuous bodily pain
does not last long; instead, pain, if extreme,
is present a very short time, and even that degree of pain which slightly
exceeds bodily pleasure does not last for many days at once. Diseases of
long duration allow an excess of bodily pleasure over pain.
5. It is impossible to live
a pleasant life without living wisely and
honorably and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and honorably
and justly without living pleasantly. Whenever any one of these is
lacking, when, for instance, the man is not able to live wisely, though
he lives honorably and justly, it is impossible for him to live a
pleasant life.
6. In order to obtain protection
from other men, any means for attaining
this end is a natural good.
7. Some men want fame and
status, thinking that they would thus make
themselves secure against other men. If the life of such men really were
secure, they have attained a natural good; if, however, it is insecure,
they have not attained the end which by nature's own prompting they
originally sought.
8. No pleasure is a bad
thing in itself, but the things which produce
certain pleasures entail disturbances many times greater than the
pleasures themselves.
9. If every pleasure had
been capable of accumulation, not only over time
but also over the entire body or at least over the principal parts of our
nature, then pleasures would never differ from one another.
10. If the things that produce
the pleasures of profligate men really
freed them from fears of the mind concerning celestial and atmospheric
phenomena, the fear of death, and the fear of pain; if, further, they
taught them to limit their desires, we should never have any fault to
find with such persons, for they would then be filled with pleasures from
every source and would never have pain of body or mind, which is what is
bad.
11. If we had never been
troubled by celestial and atmospheric phenomena,
nor by fears about death, nor by our ignorance of the limits of pains and
desires, we should have had no need of natural science.
12. It is impossible for
someone to dispel his fears about the most
important matters if he doesn't know the nature of the universe but still
gives some credence to myths. So without the study of nature there is no
enjoyment of pure pleasure.
13. There is no advantage
to obtaining protection from other men so long
as we are alarmed by events above or below the earth or in general by
whatever happens in the boundless universe.
14. Protection from other
men, secured to some extent by the power to
expel and by material prosperity, in its purest form comes from a quiet
life withdrawn from the multitude.
15. The wealth required
by nature is limited and is easy to procure; but
the wealth required by vain ideals extends to infinity.
16. Chance seldom interferes
with the wise man; his greatest and highest
interests have been, are, and will be, directed by reason throughout his
whole life.
17. The just man is most
free from disturbance, while the unjust is full
of the utmost disturbance.
18. Bodily pleasure does
not increase when the pain of want has been
removed; after that it only admits of variation. The limit of mental
pleasure, however, is reached when we reflect on these bodily pleasures
and their related emotions, which used to cause the mind the greatest
alarms.
19. Unlimited time and limited
time afford an equal amount of pleasure,
if we measure the limits of that pleasure by reason.
20. The flesh receives as
unlimited the limits of pleasure; and to
provide it requires unlimited time. But the mind, intellectually grasping
what the end and limit of the flesh is, and banishing the terrors of the
future, procures a complete and perfect life, and we have no longer any
need of unlimited time. Nevertheless the mind does not shun pleasure, and
even when circumstances make death imminent, the mind does not lack
enjoyment of the best life.
21. He who understands the
limits of life knows that it is easy to obtain
that which removes the pain of want and makes the whole of life complete
and perfect. Thus he has no longer any need of things which involve
struggle.
22. We must consider both
the ultimate end and all clear sensory
evidence, to which we refer our opinions; for otherwise everything will
be full of uncertainty and confusion.
23. If you fight against
all your sensations, you will have no standard
to which to refer, and thus no means of judging even those sensations
which you claim are false.
24. If you reject absolutely
any single sensation without stopping to
distinguish between opinion about things awaiting confirmation and that
which is already confirmed to be present, whether in sensation or in
feelings or in any application of intellect to the presentations, you
will confuse the rest of your sensations by your groundless opinion and
so you will reject every standard of truth. If in your ideas based upon
opinion you hastily affirm as true all that awaits confirmation as well
as that which does not, you will not avoid error, as you will be
maintaining the entire basis for doubt in every judgment between correct
and incorrect opinion.
25. If you do not on every
occasion refer each of your actions to the
ultimate end prescribed by nature, but instead of this in the act of
choice or avoidance turn to some other end, your actions will not be
consistent with your theories.
26. All desires that do
not lead to pain when they remain unsatisfied are
unnecessary, but the desire is easily got rid of, when the thing desired
is difficult to obtain or the desires seem likely to produce harm.
27. Of all the means which
wisdom acquires to ensure happiness throughout
the whole of life, by far the most important is friendship.
28. The same conviction
which inspires confidence that nothing we have to
fear is eternal or even of long duration, also enables us to see that in
the limited evils of this life nothing enhances our security so much as
friendship.
29. Of our desires some
are natural and necessary, others are natural but
not necessary; and others are neither natural nor necessary, but are due
to groundless opinion.
30. Those natural desires
which entail no pain when unsatisfied, though
pursued with an intense effort, are also due to groundless opinion; and
it is not because of their own nature they are not got rid of but because
of man's groundless opinions.
31. Natural justice is a
pledge of reciprocal benefit, to prevent one man
from harming or being harmed by another.
32. Those animals which
are incapable of making binding agreements with
one another not to inflict nor suffer harm are without either justice or
injustice; and likewise for those peoples who either could not or would
not form binding agreements not to inflict nor suffer harm.
33. There never was such
a thing as absolute justice, but only agreements
made in mutual dealings among men in whatever places at various times
providing against the infliction or suffering of harm.
34. Injustice is not an
evil in itself, but only in consequence of the
fear which is associated with the apprehension of being discovered by
those appointed to punish such actions.
35. It is impossible for
a man who secretly violates the terms of the
agreement not to harm or be harmed to feel confident that he will remain
undiscovered, even if he has already escaped ten thousand times; for
until his death he is never sure that he will not be detected.
36. In general justice is
the same for all, for it is something found
mutually beneficial in men's dealings, but in its application to
particular places or other circumstances the same thing is not
necessarily just for everyone.
37. Among the things held
to be just by law, whatever is proved to be of
advantage in men's dealings has the stamp of justice, whether or not it
be the same for all; but if a man makes a law and it does not prove to be
mutually advantageous, then this is no longer just. And if what is
mutually advantageous varies and only for a time corresponds to our
concept of justice, nevertheless for that time it is just for those who
do not trouble themselves about empty words, but look simply at the
facts.
38. Where without any change
in circumstances the things held to be just
by law are seen not to correspond with the concept of justice in actual
practice, such laws are not really just; but wherever the laws have
ceased to be advantageous because of a change in circumstances, in that
case the laws were for that time just when they were advantageous for the
mutual dealings of the citizens, and subsequently ceased to be just when
they were no longer advantageous.
39. The man who best knows
how to meet external threats makes into one
family all the creatures he can; and those he can not, he at any rate
does not treat as aliens; and where he finds even this impossible, he
avoids all dealings, and, so far as is advantageous, excludes them from
his life.
40. Those who possess the
power to defend themselves against threats by
their neighbors, being thus in possession of the surest guarantee of
security, live the most pleasant life with one another; and their
enjoyment of the fullest intimacy is such that if one of them dies
prematurely, the others do not lament his death as though it called for
pity.